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COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW:
AN ELEMENTARY COMPARISON
MAX

RHEINSTEIN*

For every Puerto Rican lawyer, it is elementary knowledge that the difference betwen the legal systems of his own
beautiful island and the continental United States of America
exemplifies to some measure that difference which exists between the Western world's two great legal systems, the Civil
Law and the Common Law. In an article dedicated to the
University of Puerto Rico on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of its foundation, it may thus not be inappropriate for one who has had occasioi to become acquainted with
both legal systems to express some of the ideas about their similarities and differences as they have come to present themselves to him after many 'ears of observation. But let us first
try to define what we shall mean by those two terms, Common
Law and Civil Law.
Foreign law, to a state court in the continental United
States is not only ,the law of a foreign country' but also of any
sister state in the Union. However, their laws are foreign more
in name than in substance and almost the same statement can
be made with respect to the laws of most parts of the British
Commonwealth of Nations. A well trained American lawyer will
not find it difficult to find his way in the law of England, of
Ontario. Victoria, the Bahamas or Nigeria. . lie is familiar not
olkh- with the language in which the laws, cases and law books
are writte, but lie will also feel at home in the general legal
almosphere. For good reason, most American states admit to
Max Pam Piofessor of Comparative Law, Chicago University; one
time member of the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin;
1943-44, visiting professor of law at the Colegio de Leyes, Universiclad de Puerto Rico; Dr. utr. iur 1924, Univ. of Munich, Germany,
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the bar "on motion" and without an examination any lawyer
who has had -his training and a certain practical experience
ii any jurisdiction in which the Common Law prevails. Properly, too, this. privilege does not extend to a lawyer who has
had his trainig 'and practice exclusively' in the "Civil Law".
Common Law and Civil Law, these are the two categories within
which all, or almost all, of the legal systems of the modern*world
may. be grouped. Both groups are respectively characterized
by their origin.
The Common Law group contains those laws which are
derived from that law that was administered by the one set of
central courts of His Majesty The King of England. Backed
by the strong central power of the king and supported by a
centrally organized legal profession ,these royal courts of Westminster succeeded first ini overshadowing and finally all but diniishing the innumerable local, ecclesiastical, commercial and
other special courts of England, and in thus establishing as the
common law of the realm that set of traditions, practices, precedents, rules, concepts and modes of thought and argumentation that had been developed in the centuries-long cooperation
of the organized bar of these courts and their judges, who themselves originated from, and forever remained. closely connected
with, that bar. Having thus established themselves as the courts
or court, and their law as the law of England, their law was
carried to the four corners of the earth by those English law.yers who invariably followed the English settlers wherever they
went in their colonizing ventures. Whatever may have been
the law by which the early colonists of New'England or other
parts of the North American Continent regulated their community affairs, at the time of the Revolution English Common
Law was firmly established as the law of the thirteen colonies
and later states, and with the subsequent expansion of their
union the realm of Common ILaw has been extended over the
ettirc continental United States, with- the sole, but somewhat
micertain' exception of Louisiana; as well as over part of the
American insular possesions. Other English settlers or con-,
querors have brought the Common Law to the major part of
Canada, to Australia and New Zealand and to the major part
of the*British possessions in Africa, in Central and South Ame-
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rica as well as in Asia, including the regions now constituting
the new Dominions of India and Pakistan and the new Republic
of Burma. However, in its oriental regions, the Common Law
ddes not have the same scope of application as in the West.
Matters of personal status have remained under the domination of the religious laws and the Common Law is the law of
procedure and of business ,finance and industry. If we count
these oriental'regions as Common Law countries, we can say
that at present the Common Law is holding sway over a territory of a total population of about 300 million.
While the Common Law is characterized by its having been
centered in one set of the courts and its organized bar, the Civil
Law has been centered around a book and a set of universities.
The book is the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the codification or, better,
the compilation, of the Roman Law undertaken in the days of
the very decomposition of the Roman Empire by its very latest
protagonist, the Byzantine emperor Justinian (527-565 A.D.).
Long forgotten, the Corpus Iuris was rediscovered in the 12th
century by the legal scholars of the University of Bologna,
whose law school was developed into the center of European
legal learning by several subsequent generations of outstanding
personalities. Yet, the 'Roman law which was rediscovered by'
these Bolognese scholars and, by them and their successors in
other places, expounded and adapted to the needs of change
and changing times, was not in force as such in any place.
Since it was not the law of a powerful court it could not, like
the English Common Law, suppress and eliminate, but only
influence and supplement, the local laws of continental Europe.
An ever increasing number of administrators of the numerous
princely states, large, medium, small and minuscule, of judges,
notaries and advocates, grew up to be trained at the universities
in the Roman Law or the Usius Modernus Pandectaranm,but in
actual practice they had to apply the Roman law techniques
to innumerable local and other customs of varying Germanic
origin, to village and borough customs, practices of the law
merchant' ecclesiastical canons and local statutes of the most
different kinds. With the consolidation of the national states
the demand for national legal unification was satisfied with
those great national codifications whose line begins with the
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Prussian Code of 1794 and whose high points are marked by
the French Civil Code of 1804, the German Civil Code of 1896
and the Swiss Civil Code of 1907.
While all those laws which are derived from the Common
Law of England have in common not only one particular method of thought and argumentation but also, as far as statutes
have not interfered, a body of rules, principles and maxims,
the community of the Civil Law systems consists more in a
unity of formal technique than of content. If the codified laws
of the several Civil Law countries are in many respects similar
to each other'not only in form but also in substance, such latter similarity is due not so much to any common conservation
of Roman law rules as to the fact that the similarity- of conditions in modern countries'has in that process of complete overhauling which, together with national unification characterizes
codification, produced similar solutions, as well as to the further fact that two or three codes have evidently served as models
for other countries. Through French arms the Napoleonic codi Fication- was carried to Belgium, Luxenmbourg and those parts
oF' Poland which in Napoleonic days had been constituted as,
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The outstanding qualities and
the immense prestige of this codification resulted in its imitalion in the Netherlands (1835), Italy (1869), (replaced by the
Code of 1942), Roumania (1864), (replaced by the Code of
1929), Spain (1888), Portugal (1867), andpartly through these
,latter countries, to practically all the republics of Latti-America, in many of which ideas of different origi, foreign- and
autochthonous, became also influential, however. The territories
of this group, which also contains th vast regions of the French,
Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese and formerly Italian colonial empires, as well as the formerly French regions of Quebec, and,
though to a limited extent, Louisiana, the former Spanish regions of Puerto Rico and Philippine Republic, and some Levantine countries, especially Egypt, are- sometimes spoken of
as constituiting the realm of the Romance laws. Far-reaching
similarities exist within this group not only among the civil
codes, but also with respect to procedure and to general traditions and modes of legal thought. French legal literature still
co'istitutes a common, although often, small base of legal learn-
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ing and lawyers from the various parts of this group of countries can converse with, and understand, each other almost as
easily as lawyers from different commoe" law jurisdictions. The
little word '"almost" should not be overloked, however. Italian
and, let us say, Dutch or Mexican law, not to speak of Louisiana
or Brazil, are farther apart from one another than, let us say,
the laws of Illinois and New Zealand. They, all may still be
regarded as in some sense belonging together when they are
contrasted with those laws which are sometimes said to constitute the Germanic group. The common basis of these laws is
the theoretical learning that was developed in the universities
of Central Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, especially
the so-called Pandectist School. It influenced not only the
form but, in varying combinations' with local and modern ideas,
also the substance of four great codifications, viz. the already
mentioned Prussian Code of 1794, which has now been superseded by the German Code of 1896, the Austrian Code of 1811
and the Swiss Code of 1907. The Prussian Code has had a
certain influence in Argentina, the Austrian Code has expanded
from beyond the formerly Austrian territory' into parts of the
Balkans, the German Code wag taken over almost literally in
Japan and, together with French influences, was instrumental
in the modernization and codification of the law of China, and
of decisive influence in the recent codification of Ihe law of
Greece. The Siviss Code has been taken over almost literally
in Turkey and, together with German and French ideas, has
been influential in the modern codification of Brazil.
As a third type within the major group of the Civil Law
one may regard the law of the Soviet Union. In its social, economic and political content, it is, of course, thoroughly different from the laws of liberal countries, both capitalist and
socialist. Soviet lawyers will also viogorously deny that their
law has anything in common with that of the bourgeois world.
hIowever, not even the Bolshevik Revolution was able completel to break the traditions of legal thought whih had been developed in Czari,t Russia in the course of that Westernization
which had been begun by Peter the Great and continued by
Catherine II and her successors. The conceptual tools of Soviet legal thought, even in the socialized sector of the economy,
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are those of the general Civil Law heritage, and the Civil Codes
of the several Union Republics are but condensed versions of
a Czarist draft code that had been prepared upon the basis of
common European traditions.
There remains a fourth group of Civil Law countries, viz.
the Union of South Africa and the Dominion of Ceylon. Both
were once- Dutch colonies and hi both the basic features of the
legal systems are still determined by the so- called Roman.)utci law, i.e. that thoroiughl'y, trasformed version of Rioman
law which was elaborated by the i butch jurists of the 17th and
early 18th centuries as a conhnion supplement to the divers customs of the several provinces of the United Netherlands. A
peculiar position is also occupied by H]ungary and the formerly
lhungarian parts of Czechoslovakia, where there is still in effect
a largely uneodified law the form ad substance of which are
decisively determined by the general Central European learning
of the 19th centur3v' Finally, there is Scotland, where the Coinmon Law of England has never been oficially' introduced, but
where, ,imilar to Louisiana, Common Law techniques have
considerably modified tlit conbination of Scottish customs and
.Civil Law learning vhich had moulded the peculiar system of
Scotch law.
Our brief survey has covered ahost the entire world.
Everywhere -we find legal systems which can be counted as
belonging to either the Common Law or the Civil Law group.
Differences. are considerable, however, -'%iithin each of these
groups, and in the vast regions of the Near and M-diddle East
of Africa and Oceania, both the Civil and the Common Law
are not more than a more or less superficial layer superimposed upon a base of such highly dcveloped religious laws as
those of the Hindus, the Mohammedans or the Jews, or of
tribal laws of nore or less primitive native popuLlations.
One small group of countries cannot be reckoncd amonlg
either one of the two great groups, viz. those of Scandinavia
Their
(Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland).
laws of Cermanic crigin have experienced some influence of
Roman law thought and learning, they have undergone some
partial codification, but they have preserved a peculiar character of their own, both in their traditions and in their remark-
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ably progressive modern legislation. The differences bctween
the several families of the Civil Law group are so considerable
that it might bejustified to regard the Nordic laws as another,
though peculiarly different, family of the Civil Law group.
Their special character is more clearly recognized, however,
when they are regarded as a separate group of their own.
II
The differences within the Civil Law group are so considerable that it is not easy to find any' characteristics which
they might have in common when they are all compared with
the Common Law group.
Many observers have seen the main difference between
the two systems in the roles assigned to precedent. In Common Law doctrine precedent is binding, in Civil Law theory
the judge is not so bound and is assumed to decide every case
upon the basis of his own, independently arrived interpretation of the statute. Actually, the role of precedent is quite
similar in both systems. Every law student is familiar with
the manifold techniques, especially that of distinguishing, by
which a Common Law judge can get around an inconvenient
precedent. In Civil Law countries several factors impel the
courts -to pay considerably more attention to precedent than
the theory presupposes. The judges of lower courts'know.
that their decisions can be appealed to a higher court and that
supreme court judges are unlikely to change a position they,
have once taken, especially when that position has found expression in a "jurisprudence constante", i.e. a line of consistent supreme court decisions. Where the judges are government appointed career men, as ey are almost everywhere -a
conspicuous exception is constituted by Switzerlandthey
also know that too many reversals do not look too goodon their
personal records, which form the basis for promotion; ind,
after all, every career judge hopes one diy to find himself on
-the coveted bench of the -supreme.court. Furthermore, simply
following precedent saves intellectual labor. Judges are too
*busy in every single case to engage in an independent interpretation of the law. Finally,- and perhaps of -the greatest
importance, orderly social life, especially the business life of
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a credit economy, requires legal stability' and predictability.
The public must know what the law is and consistent disregard of precedent would be socially intolerable. For all thes.e
reasons, precedent is being followed with a regularity which
is not much different from that found in Common Law countries and cases are cited by Civil Law lawyers and judges
almost as frequently as here. In some countries the role of
precedent has even been formally institutionalized. If one
Section of the German Supreme Court has once decided a
question in one way, no other Section ma ' decide it differently until the problem has been placed before a meeting of representatives of all sections of the Court. Similar provisions
exist in Austria and in other places, but not in France, where
upon a revesal by the supreme court, the Court of Cassation,
the intermediate appellate court to which the case is remanded,
is free to disregard the opinion of the supreme court and is
bound by it onl. ' after a second reversal which, in such a case,
must be pronounced by a full meeting of alf supreme court
judges. Needless to say, that such a refusal to abide by a
supreme court holding is of rare occurrence. In Germany, on
the other hand, it has been held that a lawyer becomes liable to
his client when in his handling of the' client's affairs he has
overlooked an important supreme court decision.
A more
radical recognition of the factual role of precedent cin hardly be
imagined. Yet, iii spite of this far-reaching 'role of precedent,
the Civil Law doctrine of the lack of biinding force of precedent
is not entirely without consequences. It is somewhat easier for a
Civil Law court to get away from a precedent recognized to
be erroneous or to break away even from a jurisprudence constante where new social conditiao s require a change. It can
and does happen that a supreme court reverses itself, or even
that a humble trial judge defies the Supreme Court. Only,
if he does so, he better fortify his decision with an opinion
so elaborate and comelling that he convinces not only, the commnunity of the legal profession, but also, the supreme court.
The degree to which precedent is actually followed, is
not the same in all Civil Law countries. It depends on local
attitudes and traditions and also, to a perhaps decisive extent,
upon the technical state of law reporting and indexing. Where
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cases are extensively reported and well indexed as in Germany
or France, the likelihood of an actual practice of stare decisis
is greater than in a cohntry like Spain, where it is not easy
to find the case in point. In the United States, too, precedent could hardly be followed without the tools provided by
the West Publishing Company and its competitors.
Another difference is allegedly found in the different
roles of, and attitudes toward, statute law. A Common Law
lawyer still regards the law as basically unwritten and the statutes as constituting but a patch upon the body of the unwritten common law which would be able to yield a solution
for every conceivable controversy, even though there were no
statute law at all. That attitude, whir.h also implies that
statutes in derogation of the common law be interpreted narrowly, is still the one usually pi'ofessed by common law lawyt rs.
For the civilian, statute law plays a different role. Starting
with the democratic idea of the separation of powers he holds
that the citizen cannot be bound by any rules other than those
formally. enacted by the duly elected representatives of the
people and thai there can, therefore, not exist any law outside
the formaly enacted statute. Hence, a statutory basis must be
found for every decision and, if necessary, the statute, esuecially a code, must be made to yield an answer through the
processes of extensive interpretation and analogy. Yet, significant though thisdifferent attitude towards the written law
is, its, importance must not be exaggerated. It could not differentiate the civil law from the common law before the modern codification and the rise of democratic ideas, and the, notion of the all-comprehensiveness of the statute law does still
not exist in the countries of . e uncodified Roman-Dutch,
!1ungarian and Scotch law. Besides, even in the classical
countries of the Civil Law, Italy, France and Germany, large
parts of the law, especially of administrative laws, are uncodified judge-made law of a type quite similar to that of
the Common. Law.. The. occurrence of "judge-inade law" has
notbeen limited to Common Law countries. It played -n considerable role iln Civil Law jurisdictions in pre-Code days, it
persists for the uneodified 'branches of the law, and at times,
especiallv.:recent ones, it has'repeatedly assumed the task-of
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informally changing a formally unchanged written law through
the process of shifting interpretation. The courts had to assuine, and have assumed this- task whenever a legislature has
turned out to be incapable of bringing about changes which
were imperatively, demanded by social conditions. When the
French Parliament remained inactive in spite of a rising popular demand that liability for automobile accidents be made
stricter than. the liability for negligence generally established
in the Civil Code, the Court of Cassation, in a series of sensational decisions of the early 1900s, "discovered" a statutory
basis for strict, liability in a Section of the Code in which
nobody had been able to find it during the preceding onehundred years. When the German Reichstag found itself
stymied with respect to the popular clamor for relief for those
whose savings had been lost through the. Great Inflation following World War I, it suddenly decreed that debtors were
not completely discharged when they had paid their debts
in valueless currency, basing this new rule -upon an old section.
of the Civil Code which prevailing opinion had so far held
to be insufficient for such a revolutionary innovation. In
the United States judges have to be creative because the legislatures, especially those of the states, are ill suited to take
care of all, or even all major needs for legal change. In
some European countries, especially in Central' Europe, an
alert staff of the Ministry of Justice is keeping track'of needs
for legal change and is constantly, feeding to the legislature.
the appropriate drafts. ; As long as this cooperation between
Ministry of Justice and legislature is functioning well, the /, legislature will be jealous of the judiciary and the law-creating
powers of the latter will be kept within the narrowest bounds.
These powers have to, and do, expand, however, as soon as
the law-making agencies rehx or fall down upon their job.
This same interrelation can be observed in Common Law
c-ountries.
i
Dne to the greater activity and alertness of the English
Parliament, the law-creative powers of the judiciary are generally regarded to be narrower in England than in the United
States. With the growth of such institutionalized watchdogs
of current legislative needs as the NeW York Law Revision
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Commission or the Louisiana Law histitute, it can be predicted
that the creative role of the legislature will increase at the expense of the bench. To some extent the allocation of law
creative powers between a legislature and judiciary is also
dependent on their relative political complexions. In the
United States the judiciary has for long periods been more
Utilizing the techniques
conservative than the legislatures.
of narrow statutory' interpretation and judicial control of
constitutionality of legislation, the judiciary has sought to
restrain the radicalism shown by the legislatures in their unsystematic and haphazard activities, simultaneously providing
some compensation through a more cautious process of judicial
this
law-making. By prevailing opinion among "liberals"
situation was consistently decried and criticized. More recently it seems, however, as if liberal reformers placed more trust
than in the legislatures in the once criticized courts, especially
when they are staffed with the products of liberal college and
law school teachers. The relative roles of legislature and ju-.
diciary have thus been shifting in both Common Law and Civil
Law countries. While at present in many Civil Law countries
the role of the legislature is more important than that of
the judiciary, the difference is not so much one between Colnmon Law and Civil Law as one conditioned by varied and
varying constitutional and political circumstances.
What are then essential differences between Civil Law
and Common Law? They consist, first of all, in those features
which are due to an important difference in the historical
growth of the two systems. The Commol Law, it has already'
been observed, grew up as the law of one strong court of one
strongly centralized country. Its creators were the judges
of that court, supported by the strongely organized legal profession that came to be attached to it. It was the law that
was actually in force in England and that was created, expounded and administered by judges. The Civil Law, or at
least its common core, was not q l.w administered by' judges
but one expounded by professors. It grew up not in a court
but in ihniversities, and in the form in which it was taught
there it was not in actual effect anywhere. Thus, the Common
Law developed as a case law, easuistie, often incoherent, fre-
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quently inconsistent in terminology, cautiously moving from
step to step by trial and error, but close to life, with a strong
The
sense of reality and a flavor of judicial individuality.
professorial.
Prothe
other
hand,
is
markedly
Civil Law, on
They' are concerned with
fessors are teachers and writers.
lucidity, clarity of exposition and with consistency of structure and terminology.
But their cloistered and sheltered
existence also results in a certain remoteness from life. All
these traits can be observed in their product, the Civil Law,
especially in its older stages.
However, that difference between a law centered around judges and one centered around
professors is no longer so profound as it once was in the past.
Professorial influence has been declining in Civil Law and rising in Common Law countries, especially in the United States.
In Europe, professorial influence has been curbed by the rise
of nationalism and the concomitant legal isolation of the several nations. For centuries the science ot the Civil Law had
a universal character. The same Roman Law was expounded
at the universities of all countries. This universal character
was heightened by the community' of Latin as the lingua franca
of the scholars and by the free movement of the professors
from university to university. The use of the vernacular, the
national codifications and, quite particularly, the establishment
of national supreme courts in the place of the innumerable
local courts of last resort have put an end to the ancient universality of legal learning. Thus, shortly after the unification and codification of the law of France, a French professor could say: "I do not teach the Civil Law but the Code
Napole6n."
The same fate befell the legal learning of all
Civil Law "code countries".
Today, there does no longer
exist one science of Civil Law; there are as many legal sciences
as there, are countries and in each of them the case law of
the respective supreme court has come -to occupy a pre-eminient place. True, learned treatises and articles are still influential in judicial practice and of central importance in
legal education. But while enlightment and information is
still sought and found in learned treaties, there has come to
the forc another type of writing which is now, playing the
greatbst role in the everyday practice of the courts and the
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lawyers, fiz. the annotated editions of the codes and statutes.
Everywhere in Civil Law countries the law is thus no longer
so decisively shaped by the scholars.
The judicial influence
has been oil the rise and also the influence of those members
of the high civil service who are leaving their mark not only
as statutory draftsmen but also 'as highly authoritative annotators to the, statutes drafted by them.
The exactly opposite development can be' observed in the
Common Law countries, especially the United States. Judicial
influence was at its zenith as long as the Common Law *was
the law of one set of courts. Today, the Royal Courts of
Westminster are only one set of Common Law courts among
many. The Common Law lwould long have fallen apart into
fifty or more. related systems if its exposition and development had been left entirely to the courts. As long as there
existed in Europe a multiplicity of small local courts of last
resort, the unity of the Civil Law was preserved through the
universities. *This same task has now fallen to the law sehools
of the Common Law countries, especially the United States.
Irrespective of location, the American law schools do not so
much teach the local law but American law, just as American
law is treated as a whole in the law reviews, the great treatises,
or the Restatement.. Slowly, but definitely, the professorial influence has been rising in American law. In 'constitutional
law, where the entire national scene is dominated by one great
court, the great names are still those of Marshall, Holmes,
Brandeis, or Cardozo.
In the ordinary Common Law, the
scene is dominated by' men like Ames, Wigmore, Willistou,
Bogert, Beale, or W. W. Cook. The last two names, to which
others might easily be added, indicate the enormous influence
which has been exercized by professors in the field of conflict
of laws. If professorial influence..'has been decisive, it has
been there, and it has not always been fortunate. But whatever views one may take of the gradual shift from'almnost exclusive judicial to increasingly imnportanmt scholarly influence,
its ex istence is undeniable and it has become indispensable
to prevent American law from falling apart. Tile result is
that American law is becoming more systematic, more consistent, and more precise in its terminology. Anr glance at
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the Restatement will illustrate this phenomenon. Very fortunately, so far at least, American law has not lost its closeness
to life. Its long history and continued growth as a ease law
has also not yet been obliteratcd. It is conspieious in every
one of its branches, but least, perhaps, in the conflict of laws.
The traditional consistency of the Civil Law is due not
only to its professorial origin, but, during the last one-hundred
and fifty years or so, also to the very active role that has
been played in its development by governments and their
bureaucratic civil servants. Where legislative needs are constantly watched and laws drafted by highly trained, governmental specialists more inner consistency' can be achieved than
in a law that grows haphazardly from case to case.
There
are many problems which but rarely, come to judicial decision
at all and in innumerable cases the outcome is determined
not so much by .judicial considerations of long range consistency as by the accidental circumstances of personality, the
equities of. an individual case, or advocatorial skill. Thus it
happen that we have one set of cases insisting on strict complance with the statutory formalities of a will or the creditorprotecting device of formal administration proceedings, and
another set of cases opening easy avenues of evasion; or that
we insist on prohibiting bigamy and simnltaneously, establish
an almost irrefutable presumption of the dissolution of a prior
marriage; or that we establish narrow statutory grounds for
The
divorce and simultaneously tolerate the Reno divorce.
illustrations could easily be multiplied. Sapienti sat. Here we
have a real difference to the Civil Law, at least as it exists
in the modern nations of Europe. Once a certain policy has
been decided upon, it is carried through with consistency, and
judicial attempts at frustrating legislative policies are quickly
stopped by- new legislation initiated by the Civil Service.
The very activ role of legislation has also resu1lted in a
considerable degre of modernity of present-day Civil Law. Repeatedly in its long hislory, the .!ivil Law has 1ell coumipletely
A ftor one thou.and ycars of developlment, i ll,
overhauled.
law of the Roman Empire was adapted in the 6th eentur'
A.D. to the needs of his day by Justinian. Obsolete rules and
institutions were formally eliminated and new laws were for-
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inulated to take care of the needs of a new age.

A similar

process, only this time unofficially, was carried through by
the Glossators and especially the Commentators, who adapted
the Corpus Juris to the requirements of their times. Finally,
the modern codifications again constituted thc taking of an
inventory. Obsolete law was relegated to the place where it
belongs, the museum of legal antiquities, and new ideas of
the 19th or 20th century found legislative expression. True,
the conceptual framework of the codes is still to a large extent
that of Roman law, but ii their contents the codes reflect the
policies and id'eas of the modern age. When the German Civil
Code took effect at midnight of 31 December 1899, the entire
old law, as far as it related to topics covered by the Code,
lost its force and was replaced by the brand-new laW of the
Code. "One stroke of the law-giver's pen. and whole libra.
ries are turned into waste paper."
Nothing comparable has ever happened in .the history
of the Common Law. Never has there occurred sueh a radical
break with the past. Certainly, old law is constantly overruled or repealed. But niever has there been any general overhauling. In consequence, the Common Law has been earrying
with it the growth of centuries. It is a law well adapted to
modern needs, but it has achieved this end more t1irougli gradual adaptation of awient institutious thaii th rough radical
elinimiatioi and new creation.
It has been carrvin' its long
history with it.
There is implied in that fact a certain romant ic flavor of aesthetic attractiveness, but also an occasional
diserepaney between the legal rules and the needs they are
1o serve. The, so to speak, historical character of the Coinmon law, is also responsible for another of its clara(teristic
traits. The ro/al courts at Westminster were not easily accesible to tile Common man ; they were the courts of the great
men of ti realm, and the law developed 1y them w.as a law
espeeialvy adapted to the ineeds of great men of' a landowning
aristocracy nid later of big business and finance. The little
man's problems but seldom. reached these courts whose very
costs could but deter him. Important branches of the Coimon Law. even in the United States, still bear that imprint
of their past. The law of real property, especially of landlord
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and tenant, the law of trusts, of administrations of decedents'
estates, of matrimonial property and, above all, the law of
procedure, are all worked out with admirable adaptation for
the needs of men of substance. Whether they, are always suited
to the needs of other classes, especially the lower middle class.
may wellbe doubted. In modern Civil Law countries, especially
those of Central Europe, the governmental bureaucracy has
shown great solicitude for the legal needs of the middle classes,
both rural and urban, from which its members have so largely
been recruited and upon which g~vernmental power was essentially based in the 19th century. For various reasons this
solicitude was extended in the 20th century to the proletariat,
whose interests and legal needs were sought to be safeguarded
in a far reaching policy, of, sometimes paternalistie, legislation
which has left a conspieuos mark on the 20th century code:.
In Common Law countries, including the United States, it has
not always been easy for poorly organized, or totally unorganized groups to influence legislation: Laws as to illegitimate
children, for instance, are unsatisfactory in so many states
largely because nobody could speak for them until professional
organizations of social workers have become interested in them
in recent years. Illustration could again be multiplied, but,
again, sapienti sat.
Finally several important divergencies between the two
systems are due to differences in the organization of the admini~stration of justice. The Civil Law countries have never
known anything corresponding to the separation of Equity
from Law, and they have never known the civil jury. On the
other hand, they have developed a separation from private
law of commercial law and, in recent times also of
of labor law.
The duality of court systems, remedies and
rights which has resulted in Common Law countries from the
separation of equity from law had at one time a certain parallel in the duality of ins civile awd ins honoraribm of repu)lican and classical Roman law. It has long been a thing of
the )ast and nothing corresponding to the duality of interests
law and in equity can be found in modern Civil Law.
On the other hand, Civil Law countries have not so totally
suppressed as it was the ease in Comnzon Law countries those
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special courts to which merchants resorted throughout the
Middle Ages for the settlement of controversies among themselves in accordance with the Law Merchant, the common law
of commerce all over Europe. True, modern commercial courts
are no longer established by autonomous guilds or other organizations of merchants, but are state courts as all other
courts are. But they, are staffed differently from the ordinary
courts, viz. with merchants representing various lines of business and sitting either, as in Germany, together with a prosional judge as presiding Judge, or, as in France, alone and
subject only to the appellate review by higher courts staffed
exclusively with professional judges. A court so composed
can be trusted to be familiar with the customs and usages of
'i earlier
trade and with the special problems of business.
time.s the commercial courts applied a system of laws which,
being remarkably uniform throughout Europe, was correspondingly different from the ordinary local laws. A vestige of
this former state of affairs has been preserved in the existence of separate commercial codes in almost all of the Civil
Law countries. However, it is no longer much different from
the general private law. The differences have been reduced
to a protection of commercial bova fide purchasers which is
even stronger than that' afforded other bona fide purchasers,
which, in turn, goes far beyond that of the Common Law; and
there are also a few mitigations of those general rules cor.
responding to our statute of frauds and a greater tendency
in commercial transactions to regard time as of the essence
of contract. In the main, however, the situation is simply so
that the law or those transactiops which constitute the special
domain of commerce as well as that of partnership and profit
corporations as well as that of merchant shipping is treated
in separate commercial rather than general civil codes and
courts.
In recent decades a similar development has taken place
in labor law. Its modern rules are contained in separate
statutes, which in some countries, for instance France, have
been consolidated in special labor codes. Cases arising under
those- laws are. tried and decided in special labor courts which
4re staffed together with professional judges, with represen-
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tatives of employees and employers and which thus are possessed of special experience. In Germany and some other
countries this separation exists not only in the trial court
stage but all the way up to the top of the judicial hierarchy,
so that the supreme. labor court is a body' separate from the
general supreme court. Indeed, practically in all Civil Law
countries the jurisdiction of the "general" supreme court is
less comprehensive than in those of the Common Law. Problems of administrative law are handled in separate administrative courts which sometimes constitute not only one but
several indcpendeii hierarchies, so that there may be a whole
set Of supreme courts, each having final jurisdiction in its
peculiar field of jurisdiction. Common Law observers have
occasionally misunderstood this phenomenon.
At 'one time
its purpose may have been that of guaranteeing to the executive a certain influence which it cannot exercise in the ordinary courts, i.e. the courts administering the bulk of civil legislation and the criminal law. Today, the main purpose is
that of insuring expert judicial knowledge for the handling
of cases in which such special expert knowledge is regarded
as essential.
In Common Law countries the existence of the civil jury
in ca ses at law has profoundly' influenced' not only the structure of the procedural but also of the substantive law. Our
law of torts, especially that of negligence, is not so much a
body of rules for the immediate decision of cases as for iii(1L-athi-g to the court in what situation it ought, or ought not,
to leave the decision with the jury. The necessity of claboratilg rules for the control of the jury by the judge has resulted
in certain fields of the law in-a refinement of the rules which
goes much in the corresponding fields of the Civil Law. Furthermore, the jury systeni has resulted in the establishment of
an elaborate law of evidence to which modern Civil Law knows
hardly a counterpart.
Obviously, our brief attempt at discovering at, least the
umost significant differences between the two principal legal
systems of the modern world cannot go beyond' statements of
a very general, nay, even of an over-generalizing character.
Yet if we are to see the forest, we must not try to describe
the trees,

